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  • Strategische Planung Russlandfeldzug

    Zitat von Alex Mikaberidze Beitrag anzeigen
    From what I understand in Mr. Latour-Maubourg's message (and I apologize if I am wrong), he raises the issue of my bias to Bagration and argues in favor of Barclay de Tolly. I can reassure him that I am not biased in favor of Bagration and, although an ethnic Georgian, Bagration was probably a greater Russian in spirit that any given average Russian general of his time; reading his letter make this quite clear. I agree that Barclay de Tolly effectively saved the Russian armies by insisting on the retreat and had Bagration succeeded in his plans, the Russians probably would have been defeated in the border provinces in July 1812.
    thanks for participating, its a great possibility to exchange thoughts with the author.
    actually my comment about the bias for Bagrationi was not really negatively, i also fancy Bagrationi, i just (wrongly) assumed that siding with Bagrationi also means siding with Kutuzov, as both favoured a battle at the gates of Moscow, as opposed to the "foreign" faction. of course Barclay wasn't perfect either but in my opinion he did much more to save Russia than Kutuzov, who gets almost the sole credit for saving Russia.

  • #2
    Zitat von Latour-Maubourg Beitrag anzeigen
    thanks for participating, its a great possibility to exchange thoughts with the author.
    actually my comment about the bias for Bagrationi was not really negatively, i also fancy Bagrationi, i just (wrongly) assumed that siding with Bagrationi also means siding with Kutuzov, as both favoured a battle at the gates of Moscow, as opposed to the "foreign" faction. of course Barclay wasn't perfect either but in my opinion he did much more to save Russia than Kutuzov, who gets almost the sole credit for saving Russia.
    Thank you for your response. It seems that my meager knowledge of German misled me regarding the content of your message. I agree with you that Kutuzov's role in 1812 should re-appraised and Barclay de Tolly should be credited with Russian success in 1812. Kutuzov played no role in Russian operations until 31 August and, in September, his involvement was limited to agreeing to give a battle on a terrain that he did not select and allow Barclay and Bagration freedom of actions. In many respects, Borodino could have been easily fought without Kutuzov's presence at all Two or three years back I gave a presentation on the Russian historiography of Kutuzov and the creation of the myth surrounding his personality. I plan to revise and post it on Napoleon Series in the future so if you are interested, do take a look at it.

    I will be happy to hear your future comments on the book and look forward to our discussion.

    best wishes,
    Alex

    Kommentar


    • #3
      Salut Alexander

      I would be interested about the orignal offensive stretgic plans of Russia in 1810 and the case of Jósef Poniatowski.
      What and how would the Russian emperor aim for and how to gain?
      An offensive against the might of Napoleon, even by Russia - would have been almost suicide.

      all the best

      Kommentar


      • #4
        Ich habe diesen Thread Barclay vs. "Russische Generaltät" bzw. Strategische Planung des Russlandfeldzuges neu mit den Beiträgen aus dem Thread über Alexanders Buch gebildet.

        I split the original thread covering the Borodino book by Alex to deal with the strategic aspect of the Russian campaign and the rivalry between Barclay and Bagration.

        Markus Stein
        "Wenn wir geboren werden, weinen wir, weil wir diese große Narrenbühne betreten" (King Lear) ... jedem also sein ganz persönliches (Hof-) Narrenleben

        Kommentar


        • #5
          Genesis des russ. Operationsplans ab 1810, Gelb. Buch

          (2. Posting - 1. scheint verschwunden zu sein)

          Hallo Hans-Karl,

          die Genesis des russ. Operationsplans wurde u.a. von Smitt behandelt (hier speziell Kap. V: ... Zum Russischen Operationsplan ...):
          Smitt, F. v.. Zur näheren Aufklärung über den Krieg von 1812. Leipzig, Heidelberg: C. F. Winter´sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1861.

          Details enthalten auch die Memoiren Wolzogens, der mit Phull zusammenarbeitete und den Kriegsschauplatz bereiste. Das Buch beinhaltet darüber hinaus mehrere Denkschriften für Wolchonsky und Barclay (ab 1810):
          Wolzogen, L. F. v.. Memoiren des königlich preußischen Generals der Infanterie Ludwig Freiherr v. Wolzogen. Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1851.

          Noch zum Gelben Buch: Das Buch ist insofern keine Überraschung, da es bereits in den 1962 auf Deutsch veröffentlichten Memoiren des russ. Generals Schubert behandelt wird (S. 94f):
          Schubert, F. v.. Unter dem Doppeladler. Erinnerungen eines Deutschen in russischem Offiziersdienst 1789 - 1814. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1962.

          Viele Grüße, Thomas H.

          Kommentar


          • #6
            Äh,
            zum strategischen Konzept der Russen - bedarf es noch der Zitate aus der Biographie Eugen von Württembergs, wonach der strategische Rückzug seit 1809 als Idee vorlag (zusammen mit Wolzogen) oder sind das Gemeinplätze?

            Gruß
            Jörg
            The light at the end of the tunnel
            is from an oncoming train.

            Kommentar


            • #7
              Interessanterweise hat auch York nach der Biografie von Droysen im Vorfeld des Feldzuges die Rückzugsstrategie als die für die Russen beste erklärt.

              Kommentar


              • #8
                @Tom

                Ich finde das durchaus interssant, hab aber die Quellen nicht, laut Mikaberizde sollen diese Operationspläne ja im kleinsten Kreis erarbeitet worden sein, aber offensiv, inwieweit? Eroberung Polens?

                Kommentar


                • #9
                  Smitt

                  Thomas,

                  Danke für die Tipps ... den Smitt habe ich schon vor einiger Zeit erworben - und stimmt, das ist Wahnsinn, was darin über die Russische Planung vorhanden ist.

                  Damit auch alle Anderen diese sehr gute Quelle nutzen können, habe ich die entsprechenden Seiten in einem PDF zusammen gefasst. Hier der Link zu dieser Datei: http://www.napoleon-online.de/Dokume..._Smitt1861.pdf (3,7 MB)

                  Nun können noch mehr über diese Gedanken - die sicher nicht allzu bekannt sein dürften - diskutieren.

                  Schöne Grüße
                  Markus Stein
                  "Wenn wir geboren werden, weinen wir, weil wir diese große Narrenbühne betreten" (King Lear) ... jedem also sein ganz persönliches (Hof-) Narrenleben

                  Kommentar


                  • #10
                    Zitat von HKDW Beitrag anzeigen
                    Salut Alexander

                    I would be interested about the original offensive strategic plans of Russia in 1810 and the case of Jósef Poniatowski.
                    What and how would the Russian emperor aim for and how to gain?
                    An offensive against the might of Napoleon, even by Russia - would have been almost suicide.

                    all the best
                    Dear Hans Karl,

                    Thanks for the message. The Russian strategic plans began to shape up be late 1810 and early 1811 as Franco-Russian relations deteriorated. Russia anticipated that at some point in the future these relations would reach a breaking point and the two countries will fight a war. These plans were discussed by Alexander and his close advisers and they are outlined in Emperor Alexander's letter to Francis (8/20 February 1811] and instructions to the Russian embassy [13/25 February 1811]. In his letter, Alexander wrote to Francis complaining about the French actions and, without asking for official Austrian support, he probed the Austrian ruler what he would do in case Russia and France fight a war. He hinted that in return for Austrian support, Russia would be willing to close its eyes to Austrian activities in Italy. Alexander's memo to the Russian embassy is of greater interest since it shows that Russia was willing to make additional concession to get Austrian support. The memo instructed the Russian envoy to explain to Vienna that the security of Russia is in interest of Austria (especially after 1809) and so the two countries should negotiate in case they fight Napoleon. Alexander hinted that Napoleon's intention to restore Poland would mean that Austria would be forced to surrender Galitia. If Napoleon does indeed create independent Poland, then Russia will have no choice but to attack and destroy it. To keep Austrians happy, Russia was willing to give them Wallachia and Moldavia. [1]

                    As part of such plans, Russians sought to get support from the Poles themselves. As you know Russia, historically, had very active role in Poland and Alexander hoped to utilize some of it. His attempts to get Polish support failed when Jozef Poniatowski, who was approached by the Russians (I think Czartoryski contacted him) informed Napoleon of the Russian designs. This only strengthened Napoleon's conviction that Russia was not trustworthy.

                    Between 1811 and early 1812 the Russians produced over two dozen (some say as many as 30) plans. Some of them are quite interesting, others less so. The problem with most of them, especially those prepared in early 1812, is that they are not based on recent military intelligence which the Russian high command, naturally, kept secret. As a result, plans prepared by quite senior commanders, i.e. Bagration, now seems to be out-right wrong and one is left guessing what they were thinking.

                    Since Bagration's plan is largely unknown, I will explain it here [2]:

                    Bagration was among the leading voices in the Russian army demanding offensive against Napoleon, and in the spring of 1812, he submitted his plan of operations to Alexander. Describing the situation in Europe, Bagration stated that “[Napoleon] is waiting for an appropriate moment to raise a defiant banner on the boundaries of [Russian] empire. . . .” and he appealed to the tsar to take urgent measures for the safety of Russia. For this purpose, Bagration offered to send an official letter to Napoleon explaining that Russia is interested in preserving friendly relations with France. Having confirmed its readiness to preserve and strengthen relations between both states, Russia also must offer to Napoleon “to establish a demarcation line on the Oder River or any other boundary…. No military unit should be allowed to cross this line…. The crossing of this boundary even by a single French battalion should be considered [...] as a declaration of war….” At the same time, Bagration advised the Tsar to begin diplomatic negotiations with Austria and “use any possible means to ensure either its support or at least neutrality.” An agreement with Britain might be concluded that “would provide the empire with considerable sums of money in gold and silver [and] notably raise the rate of our currency…and provide us with free navigation in Baltic Sea….”

                    In addition to his recommendation about diplomatic activities, Bagration suggested to reorganize Russian forces. He wanted to create a new force, the Army of Belostok, of some 100,000 men in the north and deploy another five divisions on the border with Eastern Prussia. Reserves of 50,000 men were to be arranged in a second line, some hundred miles behind the main army. The third line of forces was to be assembled at a distance of 100-150 miles from the second line, which would include depots that would provide the army with well-trained soldiers. These depots would move forward together with the advance of the first two lines and keep the same distance from them. Bagration wanted to establish huge magazines that should contain not less than the annual stock of food and fodder for a 250,000-man army. In addition, the Baltic fleet was to be activated to harass the French operations in the Baltic Sea.

                    Bagration argued that Napoleon would either accept this letter as announcement of war and commence the military operations, or delay a response to reinforce the French army in Germany and Poland. If Napoleon showed signs of military preparations, he offered to proceed to the Vistula River with the Army of Belostok and occupy Warsaw. The first successes, Bagration argfued, would “raise the high spirit among the soldiers…. But the main advantage of this rapid and sudden action… is to remove the theater of war from the boundaries of the empire and hold a position on Vistula that would allow us to oppose the enemy with greater determination and firmness.” Bagration also hoped to raise a national movement against the French in Prussia. With these basic recommendations for the campaign, Bagration emphasized the importance of prompt actions.

                    Another largely forgotten plan (which I discuss in "the Battle of Borodino") is that by by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Chuikevich of the Secret Chancellery of the Ministry of War. Submitted in early April 1812, the memo is completely opposite from Bagration's plan and makes it clear that Russians DID seriously consider retreating and waging a scorched-earth war, which is often disputed in western literature. Addressed to Barclay de Tolly, Chuikevich’s memo argued that Napoleon would seek a decisive battle to eliminate the enemy armies, therefore the Russians should avoid one as much as possible. Referring to the Spanish example, Chuikevich contended that ‘it is necessary to conduct a war that [Napoleon] is not accustomed to’ and to start a guerrilla war utilizing flying detachments to harass French communications and supply lines. Chuikevich anticipated that the Russians would have to abandon vast territories to Napoleon but then, having gathered sufficient forces, they would be able to give battle to the exhausted, overextended and significantly reduced enemy forces: ‘The loss of several provinces should not frighten us since the integrity of the Empire resides with the integrity of the Army.’ [3]

                    Slightly earlier than these plans, French émigré Count d' Allonville submitted his memorandum in January 1811. He wanted to establish close alliance with Britain and make a common cause with Spain, with a guarantee that its independence would be closely tied to the outcome of Russian war. D’Allonville urged a quick peace with Turkey (Russia was fighting it since 1806), even if that meant making generous concessions to them, and divert Ottoman attention to the fact that Austria, their ancient enemy, were now allied to Napoleon. So the Turks should be engaged in the war to launch a powerful diversion to Illyria and harass Mediterranean coastline. Austria was to be approached to remain neutral and, if Austrians refused, Russia was to attack it together with the Turks. A Russian observation corps was to be dispatched through Prussia to threaten Westphalia and population of northern Germany (Nord de l’Allemagne) was to be agitated for insurrection against the French. Local German ports were to be opened to the British. To secure her northern borders, Russia should negotiate with Sweden, threatening to blockade its coastline with the support of British Navy; furthermore, in case of coup d’etat, Russian had to ensure that the crown passed to “héritiers légitimes de la maison royale” who were related to Russian imperial family. Russia and Britain had to revive royalist movement in France and exploit it to divert Napoleon’s attention. Finally, d’Allonville urged to make as many diversions as possible, attacking French interests in Illyria, Naples, Calabria, Pomerania, Hanover, Holland, Brittany, Bayonne and other places. [4]

                    Besides these plans, there were also those of St. Priest, Wolzogen, Eugene of Wurttemberg, Pfuel (by 1812, official plan), etc. But I think I will stop here and wait for your comments.

                    best wishes,
                    Alex


                    [1] You can find instruction in F. Martens, Sobranie traktatov i konventsii zakluchennikh Rossiei s inostrannimi derzhavami [Compilation of Treaties and Conventions Concluded by Russia with Foreign States], (St. Petersburg, 1876), III, 78-79. (the French/Russian version is now available on the Google Books)

                    [2] Bagration to Alexander, circa March 1812 (exact date unknown), Bagration P.I. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov [Compilation of Documents and Materials, hereafter cited as Correspondence of Bagration], (Moscow, 1945), 130-38;

                    [3] Text discussed in V. Bezotosny, ‘Analiticheskii proyekt voyennikh deistvii v 1812 g. P. A. Chuikevicha,’ in Rossiiskii arkhiv, 7(1996): 43–49.

                    [4] Text can be found as Memoire politique et militaire sur les circonstances presentes par d’Allonville, in Fabry, Campagne de 1812, I, ii-iv.

                    Kommentar


                    • #11
                      Russ. 1812 Kriegspläne in der deutschsprachigen Literatur

                      Hallo Alex,

                      besten Dank für die Erläuterungen! Chuikevich war mir bisher unbekannt.

                      Interessanterweise kam der Plan des franz. Emigranten d´Allonville dem tatsächlichen Verlauf des Krieges am nächsten!

                      Hier noch ein par Hinweise zu Fundstellen in der deutschsprachigen Literatur (den Auszug aus Smitt mit der Zusammenfassung des Plans von d´Allonville, S. 293-301, und dem "modifizierten Plan" Barclays, S. 347-355, hat Markus hier dankenswerterweise schon veröffentlicht):

                      Wolzogens Memoiren (bibl. Angaben s.o.) enthalten in den Anlagen:
                      Nr. 1) "Denkschrift über Napoleon und die Art gegen ihn Krieg zu führen" für Fürst Wolchonsky, 22.08.1810, und
                      Nr. 11) "Denkschrift über die westliche Grenze Rußlands und Entwicklung einiger Ideen über einen Offensiv- und Defensiv-Plan auf dieser Grenze" für ?? (Barclay?), 30.01.1812
                      NB: Wolzogen ist gedanklich auf einer Linie mit Phull, seinem Mentor.

                      Tolls "Operationsplan 1812" ist im Band 1 der Denkwürdigkeiten, S. 468-475, abgedruckt:
                      Bernhardi, T. v. Denkwürdigkeiten des kaiserlich russischen Generals von der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll. Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1856.

                      Viele Grüße, Thomas H.

                      Kommentar


                      • #12
                        Zitat von Tom Beitrag anzeigen
                        Hallo Alex,

                        besten Dank für die Erläuterungen! Chuikevich war mir bisher unbekannt.

                        Interessanterweise kam der Plan des franz. Emigranten d´Allonville dem tatsächlichen Verlauf des Krieges am nächsten!

                        Hier noch ein par Hinweise zu Fundstellen in der deutschsprachigen Literatur (den Auszug aus Smitt mit der Zusammenfassung des Plans von d´Allonville, S. 293-301, und dem "modifizierten Plan" Barclays, S. 347-355, hat Markus hier dankenswerterweise schon veröffentlicht):

                        Wolzogens Memoiren (bibl. Angaben s.o.) enthalten in den Anlagen:
                        Nr. 1) "Denkschrift über Napoleon und die Art gegen ihn Krieg zu führen" für Fürst Wolchonsky, 22.08.1810, und
                        Nr. 11) "Denkschrift über die westliche Grenze Rußlands und Entwicklung einiger Ideen über einen Offensiv- und Defensiv-Plan auf dieser Grenze" für ?? (Barclay?), 30.01.1812
                        NB: Wolzogen ist gedanklich auf einer Linie mit Phull, seinem Mentor.

                        Tolls "Operationsplan 1812" ist im Band 1 der Denkwürdigkeiten, S. 468-475, abgedruckt:
                        Bernhardi, T. v. Denkwürdigkeiten des kaiserlich russischen Generals von der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll. Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1856.

                        Viele Grüße, Thomas H.
                        Thank you Thomas,

                        I do have Wolzogen's entire memoirs in German, and I will check details on Volkonsky's 1810 plan. By the way, Bernhardi's volumes on Toll are also available on the Google Books for download:
                        http://books.google.com/books?id=PNsKAAAAIAAJ
                        http://books.google.com/books?id=LHcIAAAAQAAJ

                        I would also suggest Gabriel Fabry's famous multi-volume study Campagne de Russie 1812, which contains specific sections dedicated to various Russian plans. Some volumes are available on the Google Books.

                        Best wishes,
                        Alex

                        Kommentar


                        • #13
                          Thomas und Alex,

                          Danke für die bibliographischen Angaben einerseits (Thomas) und vor allem schon die ausführliche Einleitung in die Planspiele Russlands andererseits (Alex).

                          Damit auch die Anderen sich ein Bild über die in den Denkwürdigkeiten Tolls (übrigens für die Russische Feldzüge 1812 bis 1814 SEHR emfpehlenswert) abgedruckten Planungen machen können, anbei der Scan der betreffenden Seiten.

                          @Thomas: kannst Du hier die Anlagen aus dem Wolzogen reinstellen? Dieses Werk fehlt mir, setze ich aber sofort auf meine "Suchliste"

                          Schöne Grüße
                          Markus Stein

                          P.S. diese Operationspläne müsste man jetzt graphisch aufbereiten (nur die Zeit dafür ...)
                          Angehängte Dateien
                          "Wenn wir geboren werden, weinen wir, weil wir diese große Narrenbühne betreten" (King Lear) ... jedem also sein ganz persönliches (Hof-) Narrenleben

                          Kommentar


                          • #14
                            Danke für die bisherigen Ausführungen.

                            @Markus

                            Das BDF von Toll ist kaum lesbar.

                            Kommentar


                            • #15
                              Wolzogens Denkschriften

                              ... und hier, wie von Markus erbeten, die Denkschriften von Wolzogen. Die schlechte Scan-Qualität bitte ich zu entschuldigen, hab´s auf die Schnelle nicht besser hingekriegt.

                              Die Denkschrift 1812 ist für den Kriegsminister, also Barclay, wie aus dem Text der Memoiren hervorgeht.

                              Viele Grüße, Thomas H.
                              Angehängte Dateien
                              Zuletzt geändert von Tom; 18.12.2007, 21:05.

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